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Shocks and Turbulence: Globalization and the Occurrence of Civil War

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Several scholars argue that systemic global trends are pulling individuals not only upward toward the global level, but also downward to the local level; the result is a potential loss of authority for the state (Ferguson and Mansbach 2004; Rosenau 1990). Their theory of “fragemegration” can provide a causal mechanism for why longstanding grievances may erupt into civil war at a particular time. While increased global exposure does provide both states and individual citizens with tremendous benefits, sudden “shocks” of globalization can overwhelm a state’s capacity to offset the negative impacts of globalization, thus weakening a state’s capacity to deal with rival polities for the allegiance of its citizens. The present study conducts a cross-sectional logistic regression with discrete duration analysis to test the impact of globalization shocks on the onset of civil wars between the years 1970–1999. The results demonstrate that increasingly dramatic changes in the level of global integration are associated with an increased risk of civil war onset.

KEYWORDS *civil war, coping mechanism, globalism, globalization, state capacity*

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Since the end of the Cold War, much scholarly attention has been paid both to the changing nature of militarized conflict as well as to an increasingly integrated world. While there has been a great reduction in warfare between states, violence within the system still remains. Rather than this conflict existing between states, much of it occurs within states. Following the end of the Cold War, this topic has increasingly come under the scrutiny of scholars of international relations. At the same time, issues associated with globalization have also merited widespread study. It is hereafter suggested that these two topics are linked. Globalization has undoubtedly increased global productivity and lifted millions of people out of poverty, and strengthened some aspects of the modern state. However, the same mechanisms that introduce prosperity can serve to contest the existing societal status quo, challenging traditional conceptions of the world and of economic, social, and political relationships within it. When the rate of globalization increases at a faster rate than a state can provide coping mechanisms for those that do not gain from it, civil conflict can occur.

Fearon and Laitin (2003) argue that, contrary to popular belief, the end of the Cold War and the subsequent removal of efforts on the part of the two global superpowers to prop up allied regimes did not result in an increase in the onset of civil wars. Instead, they contend that there has been an increase in the tendency for conflicts to start, or dormant conflicts to reemerge, over the time period dating back to the 1940s. At the same time, states have engaged in steadily increasing levels of globalization. However, this relationship need not be perfectly linear, as many individual states have experienced sudden and stark “shocks” in their level of global integration.¹ A recent example of this can be found in the Chiapas region of Mexico, which is discussed later.

This paper presents the novel empirical finding of a positive relationship between sudden changes in the level of globalization and the onset of civil wars. While globalization works to reduce the risk of civil war onset—a result consistent with previous research—sudden shocks of globalization present challenges to states to provide coping mechanisms to assist those that lose from its economic and socially transformative effects. State capacities can be overwhelmed, resulting in rising discontent among those that either can no longer compete in a globalized world or feel that their traditional way of life is being challenged. This shock can be either a large increase or a decrease in the level of global interaction of a state, creating an inverted “U” in terms of globalization shocks; that is, as the absolute rate of globalization shock increases, the risk of civil conflict rises as well.² In

¹Note that even the least engaged states, such as Bangladesh, Benin, Burundi, or Rwanda, have become more globally integrated, particularly relative to their starting points.

²This is similar in logic to the inverted “U” found by Hegre et al (2002) in regards to democratization and civil war propensity.

these situations, state capacities are unable to compensate for the turbulence associated with changes with the level of globalization.

The layout of this paper is as follows: first, a brief discussion defining globalization and globalization shocks is provided. Second, previous explanations as to why civil wars occur are discussed. This discussion ends with a version of postinternationalist theory that accounts for a missing systemic causal mechanism—shifts in the degree of global integration—which enhances our understanding of the timing of civil wars. Third, the methodology employed to empirically test the generated hypotheses is specified, along with a brief explanation of the dependent and independent variables. Fourth, empirical results are presented, offering support for this alternative explanation. Finally, the paper concludes with a discussion of the policy implications of the findings and possible avenues for future research.

GLOBALIZATION

Using an amorphous term such as globalization requires a clear definition. In this study, globalization is defined as the level of interaction that states (and the entities within them) conduct with the international community. This is an important distinction from how many social scientists use the term as a synonym for increased rates of trade³; while economic liberalism is a process that contributes to providing the preconditions to globalization, it is not the same thing.⁴ Political and social conditions are also important aspects of globalization (Rodrik 1999). Political and social globalization allow for enhanced information flows and global awareness on the part of populations. This allows ethnic groups that have moved abroad to remain in contact with fellow ethnics in addition to remaining aware of the political occurrences in their ancestral homeland. By incorporating these exchanges into the definition of globalization accounts, the present paper accounts for criticisms that while the economic portion of globalization is frequently noted and studied, the social aspects are often not included in such analyses (Iqbal and Zorn 2006).

Additionally, the definition of globalization used here differentiates itself from previous periods of high levels of globalism, such as the early twentieth century, in that a greater number of people are involved due to the reduced

³For examples of globalization being used to describe an increase in trade, see Dollar and Kraay (2002) or Milner and Kubota (2005). Recent work by Elbadawi and Hegre (2008) measures globalization and economic shocks in much the same way.

⁴Economic globalization is more than just trade. It involves an integration of financial and investment sectors that contribute to creating a more fully integrated world market between individuals and firms. This requires us to look at more than just how governments engage each other and explore contacts between individuals and firms. As the current credit crisis illustrates, even if states intervene in the global economy, their role is limited and systemic changes impact states far more than they impact the system.

transactions costs of interconnectedness. This brings our definition closer to that of complex interdependence theorists Keohane and Nye (2000:108), who argue that globalization entails the density of networks, institutional velocity, and transnational participation increasing “not just in degree but in kind.” As trade networks multiply and deepen, so too do social and cultural bonds.

This results in a subtle, albeit key, difference from the traditional liberal definition of globalization and how it is operationalized. Globalization is not just increased levels of trade between the wealthy segments of the population in select countries; rather globalization allows expanding levels of people from differing economic classes and various countries to have access (though with differing levels of equality) to the global market and social and political global interaction. Rosenau describes this process as the rise of the “global middle class,” as wide segments of society are for the first time able to interact globally, rather than just political elites and a small class of merchants that had traditionally done so (2003:348–368). For example, it is not uncommon to hear young people listening to the same hip-hop or dance club songs or watching the same movies in Amsterdam, Rio de Janeiro, or Seoul. Similarly, travelers garnering information from periodicals such as the *Economist* or *Time* are a common sight in any of the world’s major airports. In this way, economic globalism, while important, is not the only component of globalization; social and political interactions are components as well.⁵

This article empirically analyzes one aspect of the theory posited by Rosenau and others so called “postinternationalists” that the world is experiencing “fraggementation.”⁶ Rosenau states that fraggementation “is intended to suggest the pervasive interaction between fragmenting and integrating dynamics unfolding at every level of community.” He continues, arguing that while “diverse economic factors are indeed central to the configurations of the emergent epoch . . . so are cultural, social, political, and ecological processes” (2003:11–12). Owing to the multiple ways in which globalization impacts both old and new social identities, Rosenau posits that “the forces of fragmentation are rooted in the psychic comfort individuals derive from the familiar, close-at-hand values and practices of their neighborhoods, just as the forces of integration stem from their aspirations to share in the distant products of the global economy, to benefit from the efficiencies of

⁵This also fits well with the established literature of “international” and “world society” developed under the rubric of the English School and more generally within sociology. For an in-depth discussion from the English School perspective on this topic, see Brown (2001), Buzan (1993), and Buzan and Little (1994). For a sociological perspective, see Meyer et al (1997). Finally, to examine the development of state and nonstate actors coexisting within a “world society,” see Rosenau (1988).

⁶This term was first coined by Rosenau (1990:3) and refers to the work done by several contemporary scholars, such as the previously noted Rosenau (1990, 1997, 2003) and Ferguson and Mansbach (2003, 2004), as well as Ruggie (1998). Postinternational scholars claim lineage from classic theorists such as Thomas Paine and Immanuel Kant, as well as more recent figures such as Karl Deutsch. The interdependence and regime theories focus on nonstate actors, much like Keohane ([1984] 2005) and Keohane and Nye (1971, [1977] 1989), but postinternationalists tend to emphasize their role to a greater extent.

regional unity . . .” (2003:16). That is, systemic global trends are not only pulling individuals upward toward the global level but also downward to the local level. The result in many places is a reduction of state authority.⁷ States lose authority as their legitimacy⁸ to rule is called into question if they are unresponsive to the changing economic and social climates; such a loss of legitimacy may result in what Hedley Bull ([1977] 2002) described as “neomedievalism.”

GLOBALIZATION SHOCKS

Globalization serves to increase the overall resources and capacity of states. However, some states may not have the ability to employ coping mechanisms to offset the rising turbulence caused by the restructuring of society and the negative reactions of some pockets of the population toward a rapidly changing world. While states seek to take advantage of the benefits of globalization, they are forced to account for the grievances of those domestic actors that lose in the face of increased competition or face challenges to traditional ways of life. If these coping mechanisms are unable to mitigate the turbulent effects, then civil strife may result and the state may break down or face challenges as a result of a globalization shock.

A globalization shock is a dramatic increase or decrease in the level of interactions that a state experiences with the global community. Such a shock disrupts traditional domestic relationships and puts strains on status quo relationships. Sudden shocks of globalization may introduce unfamiliar social concepts that undermine traditional religious values. For example, in recent years cell phones have increasingly been used to facilitate financial transactions in countries all over the world (Chatain et al. 2008). An unintended consequence has been that mobile technologies are also linking people more closely via social networks, with sometimes undesirable results. A recent case in point is the political firestorm in Pakistan generated from the social media outlet Facebook when some users hosted an event called “Draw Muhammad Day.” In response, the government suspended access to the Web site for its 25 million Facebook users, citing religious blasphemy, before a court ordered that access restored (*New York Times* 2010a, 2010b). Globalization shocks may also impact the economic sector by rendering some markets or sectors suddenly obsolete in the face of cheaper, higher quality foreign goods. In such a scenario, employees of that sector would suddenly find themselves unemployed.

⁷Proponents of the state weakening argument are not without their critics. For a countering view, see Gilpin (2001), Hirst and Thompson (1999), Walt (2002), or Waltz (2000).

⁸Legitimacy is the accepted right to rule or exercise authority over a population.

It is the speed with which a globalization shock occurs that is key. Over time, a government may be able to amass and distribute resources to those that lose in the short term. However, if a domestic industry is suddenly rendered uncompetitive overnight, those employees that are now without work react to their state of affairs immediately. States with strong institutions can provide coping mechanisms to withstand shocks while states that do not face an increased risk of civil war. Examples of coping mechanisms include job retraining programs, assistance for domestic social organizations, or strengthening security forces. However, even states with strong coping mechanisms may not be able to address a severe shock quickly enough to offset the discontent experienced by globalization's losers.

Globalization shocks impact all types of states, even weak states that seemingly do not provide their citizens much in way of goods and services. All governments have a selectorate for whom they must provide goods and services and, if they fail to do so, they face challenges to their power (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 1999, 2003; Morrow et al. 2008). If this relationship between the selectorate and the weak state is disrupted, the state is more likely to fail. Furthermore, increased exposure to the global marketplace and the transferring of ideas and norms may raise the expectations of domestic inhabitants and cause them to make new demands on the government (Ganguly 1996:83; Rosenau 2003). These demands could be in the form of new rights or services or even demands of protections from those same outside ideas that potentially challenge traditional practices. An example of this can be found in the Islamic Republic of Iran, where many people have gained illegal access to foreign media outlets for news and entertainment. While for some citizens this has resulted in an increased awareness in how other countries are governed and—as was recently seen during the fallout from the disputed 2009 presidential election—made calls for increased transparency on the part of their government, other citizens see these same ideas and values as an attack on traditional social norms and a source of immorality that must be dealt with.

In addition, even outlets that often thought to thrive in times of discord, such as shadow state institutions—powerful interest groups of invisible financial networks between global and domestic actors in developing countries outside the scope of the recognized government (Reno 1998)—are susceptible to challenges in the event of globalization shocks. This is because these shocks disrupt the status quo and challenge domestic power relationships. At the same time, political turbulence puts global trafficking at risk because global actors are not afforded stable domestic actors with whom to work. Even in the event that some of these shadow institutions eventually gain from the onset of a civil war, the uncertainty associated with these shocks generates risks that they must consider and account for. In either case, the governments in weak states face risks if traditional economic, social, or political relationships are challenged.

This concept of a globalization shock is based on the idea that an exogenous shock can have a profound impact to disrupt and change the established equilibrium. This is closely related to the logic espoused by Goertz and Diehl (1995) regarding political shocks. They argue that “a political shock is a dramatic change in the international system or its subsystems that fundamentally alters the processes, relationships, and expectations that drive nation-state interactions” (1995:31). In the present study, this concept of a shock is extended to include those processes, relationships, and expectations of actors within a state.

Looking at Table 1, it is proposed that countries that experience a dramatic shock—either an increase or a decrease—in the level of integration and have weak coping mechanisms in place are more likely to experience domestic discontent. The strong state/weak state dynamic is important because strong states have more resources to either buy off the sudden opposition via welfare mechanisms (Garrett 1998; Hays 2009) or increase repressive means via police and military presence (Carey 2006; Fearon and Laitin 2003). In the case of weak states, however, collective action problems arising from exogenous forces are more difficult to manage. For example, in a study focusing on Latin America, Hausmann and Gavin (1996) find that shocks to trade and capital accounts have emerged as a major problem for macroeconomic policy.

Shocks that increase global integration in states make civil war onset more likely. This is because globalization has winners and losers at both the international and domestic levels (Fordham 2008). Those that are ill-equipped to compete in suddenly more competitive markets or those that find traditional values challenged by a sudden onslaught of new ideas and world views may experience anger. On the other hand, states that experience a sudden decrease in global integration are likely to be weakened, as their economic and political resources have been reduced, making themselves more vulnerable to opposition groups.⁹

TABLE 1 Theoretical Expectations of Globalization Shocks

	Globalization shock	
	Increase	Decrease
Coping mechanisms		
Strong	Successful integration	Successful crisis aversion
Weak	Increased risk of greed/grievance	Increased risk of state weakness

Globalization shock is the percent change in level of globalization from the previous year. Coping mechanism is proxied by state strength, commonly measured as the GDP/capita.

⁹The first outcome is similar to the greed/grievance explanation for civil wars that is proposed by Collier and Hoeffler (2002, 2004) while the second resembles the state weakness theory posited by Fearon and Laitin (2003).

Both of these situations can be offset if a state can utilize strong coping mechanisms. Governments can employ coping mechanisms to mitigate or limit discontent associated with globalization shocks. If no such coping mechanisms are in place or they are ineffective, then discontent associated with globalization shocks are left unchallenged and this anger may be expressed in less constructive and potentially dangerous ways.

CIVIL WAR ONSET

Globalization impacts the state in several ways. It can generate tremendous economic gains. However, states with weak institutions are unlikely to be able to either offset the turbulent nature of globalization or compete with other polities for their citizen's loyalty. This provides an increase in our understanding of why civil wars occur over present theories. Globalization may be the causal mechanism that leads to a weakening of states' domestic institutions. In turn, this weakening provides legitimate competition for the states from both global forces and local forces. Polities from each direction attempt to offset the perceived loss of control over individuals' lives and create economic incentives for controlling the government apparatus.

Previous research on the occurrence of civil wars has found a number of potential causes. Some theorize that ethnic or identity focused grievances related to control and division of economic resources are the root cause of insurgency (Chassang and Miguel 2009; Clark 2005; Collier and Hoeffler 2002, 2004; Ellingsen 2000; Gurr 1971; Huntington 1968; Morey 2009) while others focus on greed or the ease of looting natural resources (Lujala, Gleditsch, and Gilmore 2005; Oyefusi 2008; Ross 2004). Another explanation of civil war occurrence focuses on domestic nationalist and social movements (Conner 1994; Kaufman 1996; Sambanis 2001; Skocpol 1979), particularly during periods of transition in terms of regime type (Hegre et al. 2002). Still others argue that the weakness of the state itself is the primary cause, as the state's security forces may be too feeble to effectively isolate and discriminately eliminate insurgents (Fearon and Laitin 2003; Metz 2000). This may be a result of political decay as institutions become less connected or relevant to some or all of the domestic population (Francisco 1996; Ganguly 1996).

Government leaders in weak states may also engage in diversionary warfare, creating internal scapegoats for problems (Gurr 2000; Snyder and Ballentine 1996) and target ethnic or social minorities in an effort to avoid more general unrest (Tir and Jasinki 2008). Internal diversionary tactics may be more appealing as weak states likely have greater power asymmetries with internal opponents than with neighboring states, giving them a greater opportunity for victory and aiding the current government in its quest to

maintain power (Cunningham, Gleditsch, and Salehyan 2009; Heger and Salehyan 2007; Morgan and Bickers 1992; Tir and Jasinski 2008).

Missing from these analyses is the causal mechanism for when any of these often long-standing mechanisms might occur at a precise time. What is the reason for long-standing grievances to be triggered at a given point in time? Why are nationalist and social movements gaining steam? Finally, why has the state weakened in the time prior to militant uprisings? An alternative theory focusing on the turbulent nature of globalization and the inability of states to alleviate sudden shocks associated with globalization helps address these questions.

Dramatic shocks in globalization may effectively be an unaccounted intervening variable in each argument (Ferguson and Mansbach 2004; Rosenau 1990, 2003; Stiglitz 2003). While the previous theories attempt to account for *why* civil wars occur, sudden increases of globalization account for *when* they occur.¹⁰ Therefore, globalization provides the causal mechanism for these alternative explanatory theories. Barbieri and Reuveny (2005) and Elbadawi and Hegre (2008) have previously tested the systemic effects of economic globalization and find that globalization reduces the likelihood for civil war. The present paper does not challenge the basic premise that increased global integration benefits states and citizens. Instead, building on their groundbreaking work, it is posited here that sudden shocks of globalization may prove to be more destabilizing than gradual increases. This idea is tested with a more accurate measurement of globalization than these previous studies.

Globalization has many attractive features that encourage states to integrate into the global system. According to Dollar and Kraay, in “two to three years . . . the world economy produce[s] the same amount of goods and services that it did during the entire nineteenth century” (2002:123). Owing to this, states are able to accumulate a far greater amount of material wealth. This can be distributed to the citizenry to buy off potential domestic adversaries, as well as to improve the general welfare. Furthermore, the economic effects of integration allow for states to specialize in specific industries, reaping the benefits of comparative advantage that allow consumers to purchase more goods at cheaper prices and create employment opportunities (Dreher 2006; Ricardo [1817] 2004; Smith [1776] 2004; Wolf 2005).

In addition, even states with limited capabilities may be compelled to increase or speed up integration with the wider international body. As Iverson and Cusack (2000) point out, there are negative domestic responses to not increasing openness. Fordham (2008) suggests that political elites are

¹⁰An exception to this is the work of Thyne (2006, 2010). Using a bargaining model he finds that cheap signals by foreign states create discord between their expected behavior, resulting in miscalculations of either their strength or that of the opposition among government and insurgent leaders.

the most likely to push for this, as they tend to also have the most access to capital and stand to receive the largest economic benefits from opening markets. This helps to explain why authoritarian regimes may seek greater levels of global integration despite their being responsive to a smaller electorate than their democratic counterparts.

However, these benefits come with some risk. As Fordham notes, “[n]ot everyone benefits equally from international trade and investment. Indeed, even though a relatively liberal international economy brings aggregate benefits to the nation as a whole, some individuals can nevertheless expect to see their incomes decline relative to what they would have enjoyed under more autarkic conditions” (2008:166). Rodrik reiterates this point, noting that “since trade policy almost always has redistributive consequences. . .one should not expect broad popular support for trade when trade involves exchanges that clash with (and erode) prevailing domestic social arrangements” (1997:380).

Following these shocks in the current economic, social, or political orders, it may suddenly be favorable for many of those that lose to see joining an insurgency as in their own interests as the costs of joining are reduced. Additionally, the short-term utility of these suddenly displaced people toward joining an insurgent group increases as such groups can offer protections and services that the state can no longer provide. After shocks and the increase in insurgent membership owing to the change in economic calculations, states are unable to collect the necessary resources to effectively put down uprisings.

Furthermore, globalization is more than simply economic openness or integration; it has social and political aspects as well. As Krasner notes, “[g]reater openness exposes the domestic economy to the exigencies of the world market . . . Social instability is thereby increased, since there is friction in moving factors, particularly labor, from one sector to another” (1976:319). The spillover effects of globalization in the social realm may prove to be destabilizing to governments and overwhelm their capabilities to address them. These social changes alter the status quo, potentially challenging current social norms and the legitimacy of a government based on them.

As the state can no longer perform traditional economic roles, it loses some of its legitimacy by failing to fulfill citizens’ expectations of stability. Individuals turn to other polities that have competed with it for their loyalties (Barber 1995; Kaplan 2000). Tir and Jasinski argue that “certain segments of the society may feel a greater affinity to their own group or even to another state than to the state of which they are nominally citizens” (2008:644). Such a community is not based on territory; instead, individuals are linked by ethnicity, kinship, or even agreed upon values, whether religious, financial, political, ideological, or otherwise. Instead, a “moral community presumes a normative consensus among individuals *at least on some key issues* which is

expressed explicitly or implicitly as a politically relevant identity” (Ferguson and Mansbach 2004:130, emphasis in original).¹¹ Rosenau (2003) describes this situation as one of “distant proximities,” as individuals may be part of a moral community that is made up of a relatively small number that spans the length of the globe, yet may have little in common with others that are within a close physical proximity.

Related to this is the concept of psychological distance. This entails “the degree of dissimilarity between cognitive frameworks or ways of looking at, assigning meaning to, and coping with the world regardless of geographical distance” (Ferguson and Mansbach 2004:69). Previous research has demonstrated that states with divided societies experience reduced rates of economic growth and experience a weakening of institutions that manage domestic conflicts (Rodrik 1999). When there is an increase in psychological distance between the state and its citizens, the likelihood of conflict increases. Groups that maintain a high level of psychological distance may engage in secessionist civil wars in response to the perceived differences in values between their moral community and the government. Additionally, such groups may receive political aid and material support from others that closely identify with them or consider themselves as psychologically similar (Huntington 1996). While these options existed in the past, the ease of financial and informational flows greatly enhance this process (Barber 1995).

These challenges to an individual or group’s social identity provides an attack on their psychological well-being, prompting some to resist, sometimes violently, the forces that they believe are the cause of it (Barber 1995; Kaplan 2000). According to this line of thought, globalization helps create changes in the identity structure that support nationalist or identity based politics, often spurred by perceived grievances. Globalization provides the external shock to awaken dormant identities that may then attempt to assert themselves, either by capturing the state or seeking their own state. In either case, an onset in civil war is more likely.

The previous discussion focused on how globalization impacts state capacity. Yet, this provides no explanation of why any group would fight for control of the state. This question is central to the arguments put forth by Collier and Hoeffler (2002, 2004) and, to a lesser extent, by Fearon and Laitin (2003). The study now turns to this issue.

The benefits associated with a state’s international legal sovereignty from the global economic markets and international actors are an important reason for controlling the government apparatus or creating a new, separate state. International legal sovereignty is defined as “the practices

¹¹The term “moral community” should not be considered to hold any *actual* normatively superior connotation; rather, it simply means that a group is united by a commonly accepted value or belief and they believe it to be normatively superior. See Buzan (1993:339) for a similar sentiment. Haas’ (1992) idea of “epistemic communities” can be considered one type of moral community based on technical expertise.

associated with mutual recognition, usually between territorial entities that have formal juridical independence” (Krasner 1999:3). This sovereignty is conferred to states by other states, regardless of whether the state receiving this legal status is even the primary source of people’s loyalties. This international legitimacy is extended to the recognized government of control or regulation of natural resources and taxation, including that of transnational corporations. However, due to the lack of internal control that these states have over the means of violence, legal sovereignty actually increases the desire to receive the economic benefits that international financial institutions award to whomever currently controls the “government,”¹² regardless of how ineffective or unrepresentative that state is.

Recurrent conflict is prevalent in many of these cases, which are usually underdeveloped economically with a heightened risk of ethnic conflict (Elbadawi and Sambanis 2002). States with limited capabilities to withstand external shocks are likely to see repeated cycles of civil war, as the government is unable to address turbulence brought by these shocks; as such, insurgent groups provide an alternative to the current government. Additionally, repressed or minority populations may seek their own sovereign states to enjoy the benefits of international sovereignty or to avoid discrimination as political institutions decay and cannot or will not provide such protections (Ganguly 1996:92). In this way, the configuration of the international system itself contributes to the internal political relationships within a given territory and how that entity operates on the world scene.

Increased levels of globalization allow opportunities for rebel groups to receive outside support when confronting domestic governments, particularly in times of internal turmoil. Globalization has made it easier for foreign support to provide support to rebel populations, often from diasporas of fellow ethnics abroad. This can be done in the form of financial support, arms shipments, and even pressuring their own governments to provide support. While these options existed in the past, the ease of financial and informational flows greatly enhance this process.

In sum, as the international community becomes more integrated, groups are increasingly aware of the situations in other countries and expectations are similarly adjusted. Furthermore, increased financial integration allows for sudden transformations that can overwhelm states capabilities in response to them, resulting in their breakdown if they are incapable to respond to the changing conditions and expectations of their citizens. If these sudden changes prove to outweigh a state’s ability to provide coping mechanisms, there is an increased possibility for civil war.

¹²These rewards can include eligibility for International Monetary Fund and World Bank loans, as well as formal aid from other states.

The discussion of the economic benefits and grievances that groups may hold fits well with the theory presented by Collier and Hoeffler (2002, 2004) concerning state capture. Insurgencies emerge to gain the perceived new benefits from increased trade and other benefits associated with globalization, especially when those benefits and that trade is derived from tangible resources that are easy to control, such as resources like diamond mines or oil fields.¹³ Furthermore, Fearon and Laitin's (2003) theory of state weakness is also accounted for as negative shocks will reduce the state's resources and its ability to eliminate insurgents. However, the present discussion differs from these in that the catalyst for this is identified as shocks of globalization.

Moreover, neither the identity nor the economic aspects of globalization are mutually exclusive. Economic turbulence can occur in times of growth as well, as the workforce may be forced to transition toward a new labor structure, for which some prove ill-suited. Rapid change can cause some to seek a return to a simpler time, whether that time is an imagined one or not. For example, Rosenau (2003) suggests that some turn to religious fundamentalism to help cope with an unstable, changing world.

The previous discussion generates two hypotheses regarding the relationship between globalization and civil war onset. Consistent with previous research (Barbieri and Reuveny 2005), it would be expected that states with increased levels of globalization also have fewer civil conflicts. This stems from the numerous benefits that globalization brings to states, such as increases in income per capita, which is associated with state strength (Collier and Hoeffler 2002, 2004; Fearon and Laiton 2003). However, it is expected that large relative increases, or shocks, in globalization would be associated with an increase in the probability of insurgency, as government institutions are unable to provide adequate coping mechanisms for sudden increases in turbulence.

H₁: States that experience shocks of globalization are more likely to experience the onset of a civil war.

In addition, economically weak states are less likely to be able to provide coping mechanisms to their citizens in the form of welfare benefits and are less likely to have a strong security apparatus to quell discontent. As such, the negative forces associated with globalization shocks in weak states are likely to be exacerbated.

H₂: Weak states that experience shocks of globalization are more likely to experience the onset of a civil war.

¹³Some argue that these resources are used to buy off opposition and actually serve to prevent civil war. See Fjelde (2009).

DEPENDENT VARIABLE

Using the definition that is employed by Fearon and Laitin (2003), the dependent variable is a dichotomous measure of the onset of civil war (1 indicating a civil war, 0 indicating the absence of civil war). The standards employed by Fearon and Laitin (2003:76) are as follows: 1) they involved fighting between agents of (or claimants to) a state and organized groups who sought either to take control of a government, take power in a region, or use violence to bring about a change in government policies; 2) the conflict killed or has killed at least 1,000 over its course; and 3) at least 100 of the dead are on the side of the government (including civilians attacked by rebels). This last condition is intended to rule out state-led massacres where there is no real organized or effective rebel opposition (2003:76). In the time period being studied, there are 51 cases of civil war onset.

INDEPENDENT VARIABLES

Globalization is a complex variable that is often difficult to operationalize. In this study, globalization is operationalized as the KOF index of globalization (Dreher 2006; updated in Dreher, Gaston, and Martens 2008). This measurement is useful in that it uses several different components to track globalization, providing a more complete picture of this complex phenomenon than simply using just a few proxy variables or one narrow measure. This is important because, as Dreher (2006:1092) notes:

Most dimensions of globalization are strongly related to each other, so including them separately in a regression induces collinearity problems. Excluding those dimensions which are not the primary focus of the analysis—the method preferred in the literature—can, however, severely bias the coefficients estimated. Moreover, it is not obvious that all dimensions of globalization affect economic performance in the same direction. Since the overall effects of globalization are what matters, the lack of an overall measure and an analysis of its relationship with growth is a serious omission.

By creating an index of different indicators to weigh globalization, the KOF index is robust and provides an accurate general picture of how integrated states are into the global community that might otherwise be missed. This is a weighted variable that measures the effects of economic, social, and political globalization. Each of these components of the index are also tested in order to more completely explore the relationship of globalization and civil war.

As economic interdependency increases, it may increase the number of people that are engaged in global finance, trade, and other economic activities. These are taken from the economic indicators of the KOF globalization index. This index is made up of information that demonstrates actual flows data (trade as a percent of GDP, flows of foreign direct investment as a percent of GDP, stocks of foreign direct investment as a percent of GDP, portfolio investment as a percent of GDP, and income payments to foreign nationals as a percent of GDP) and restriction data (hidden import barriers, mean tariff rate, taxes on international trade as a percent of current revenue, and capital account restrictions). Such a rich reservoir of measurements allows for a more accurate picture of economic globalization than simply considering trade or trade openness alone, as is frequently used in studies of this nature (that is, Barbieri and Reuveny 2005; Elbadawi and Hegre 2008; McDonald 2004). As such, this measure offers a more complete picture of economic globalization than previous studies.

The political globalization component (embassies in a country, membership in international organizations, and participation in U.N. Security Council missions) and social globalization elements, such as personal contact data (outgoing telephone traffic, transfers as a percent of GDP, international tourism, foreign population as a percent of total population, and international letters per capita), informational flows data (internet users per 1,000 people, cable television per 1,000 people, trade in newspapers as a percent of GDP, and radios per 1,000 people) and cultural proximity data (the number of McDonald's restaurants per capita, the number of Ikeas per capital, and trade in books as a percent of GDP) demonstrate how much a state's civil culture is interlinked into globalizing forces.¹⁴

It is expected that the more open a state is economically, politically and socially, the greater the level of trade and economic growth that accompanies it. Economic integration can provide for job growth and an increase in consumer goods. In addition, states that create barriers to foreign trade can expect less economic dynamism. However, this openness can also make a state more vulnerable to sudden increases in the level of globalization, or shocks, increasing the likelihood of the onset of civil war. Globalization, as a composite index, as well as divided into its components of economic, political and social globalization, is lagged one year.¹⁵

¹⁴It is important to keep in mind that these measures are proxy variables for the rather opaque concept of globalization. They are in no way intended to be exhaustive, but they are able to capture the general concept. In particular, while the measurements based on McDonalds, Ikeas, and the trade of books are not ideal, they are intended to capture how culturally linked a country is with the rest of the world and, for better or worse, the two companies are large global companies and books have long spread ideas across borders.

¹⁵Various other lag periods were also tested. Models with the globalization and globalization shock variables that were lagged more than four years found no statistical significance. This is not unsurprising given the expectation that the impact of shocks of globalization is temporary.

A globalization shock variable (shown in Table 4, discussed later) was used to test the impact of a sudden, dramatic increase in the level of globalization that a state experiences. This variable was created by taking a state's current level of globalization (or the appropriate component of it depending on the model) and subtracting its value in the previous year. This globalization difference was then divided by the present year in order to capture the amount of shock that the state experienced. This percentage measure is more valuable in understanding the impact of the shock than the globalization difference would be alone, as it accounts for the state's previous level of globalization. A shift in the globalization index of one point on a state with an already high score has a different substantive impact than on a country that is more isolationist. States that are not prepared or accustomed to globalization react to increasing levels of it differently than those that are already highly integrated. By operationalizing the change as a percent, a change in the variable score should impact all levels of globalization the same. It is worth noting that cases where there is no data for the previous year are treated as missing data and left out of the analysis.

In addition, this variable is treated in absolute terms. This accounts for both positive and negative shocks. This is important because the theory presented in this paper finds that dramatic changes in the level of global integration, either increasing or decreasing, are destabilizing and present a threat to government. In the cases where an increase occurs, traditional ways of life—economic, social, and political—are challenged and those that cannot compete or do not accept the new order are alienated. Cases with sudden decreases may face an overmatched government that has been suddenly cut off from trade partners and political allies. This created an inverted “U” in terms of globalization shocks on civil war onset risk, as presented in Figure 1 and discussed in the introduction.

Some may suggest that a sudden decrease in globalization may be endogenous to the occurrence of civil wars; that is, other states may sense pending trouble and reduce interaction with the endangered state. Such an explanation cannot account for the more common occurrence where a dramatic increase in globalization immediately precedes the onset of civil war. Of the 51 cases of civil war occurrence, 35 experience increases in globalization prior to their conflict, whereas 14 experience decreases, and 2 lack sufficient KOF data to be included in the empirical analysis. These results provide some initial face validity to arguments presented previously. In addition, the full ranges of both positive and negative values were tested in addition to the absolute values. These results were also statistically significant and the coefficients were larger than the absolute values used here. However, absolute values are used in the analyses that follow because the theory presented earlier holds that all shocks are potentially destabilizing. Descriptive statistics for all independent variables and control variables are presented in Table 2.

TABLE 2 Summary Statistics of Dependent and Independent Variables, 1970–1999

Variable	Observations	Mean	Standard deviation	Min	Max	Expected sign
Civil war	3222	0.016	0.125	0	1	N/A
Globalization	3107	41.623	17.802	7.877	92.780	–
Economic globalization	2905	45.164	19.283	7.531	95.555	–
Social globalization	3082	35.906	20.219	1.964	93.966	–
Political globalization	3107	45.778	24.434	1	97.773	–
Globalization shock	3106	3.127	3.773	0	54.667	+
Economic shock	2797	4.469	7.513	0	225.214	+
Social shock	2968	2.839	5.589	0	60.732	+
Political shock	2992	6.165	10.207	0	203.327	+
GDP/capita	3189	4.759	5.078	0.196	41.021	–
Prior war	3222	0.160	0.366	0	1	+
Population	3222	9.184	1.519	5.403	14.029	+
Mountains	3222	1.986	1.428	0	4.324	+
Noncontiguous	3222	0.188	0.391	0	1	+
Oil	3222	0.147	0.354	0	1	+
New state	3222	0.010	0.099	0	1	+
Instability	3221	0.146	.353	0	1	+
Democracy	3219	0.955	7.725	–10	10	–
Ethnic fraction	3222	0.398	0.292	0.004	0.925	+
Religious fraction	3222	0.383	0.217	0.020	0.783	+

CONTROL VARIABLES

Fearon and Laitin control for several variables that are reproduced here. All of these variables are the same as presented by Fearon and Laitin (2003) and were obtained from their data set. A brief summary of each follows.

Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita income is measured in 1985 US dollars and lagged one year. Fearon and Laitin treat this variable as a proxy for the strength of the state and it is likewise employed as such here.¹⁶*Prior war*, as states already in a state of civil war cannot engage in a new one. This is a dichotomous variable and is lagged one year. *Population* is logged and lagged one year. *Mountains* and *noncontiguous* territory are optimal for insurgent warfare and are associated with a greater propensity of its occurrence (Buhaug and Gates 2002; Galula 2006). Mountainous terrain is a logged variable measuring the percent of the country that is mountainous. Noncontiguous territory is a dichotomous variable. *Oil* is a dummy variable of countries whose exports of fossil fuels make up at least one-third of their export revenues. *Instability* is a dichotomous variable indicating whether or not a state has experienced a change of 3 or greater on the Polity IV index within the last 3 years and it is lagged one year. *Democracy* is from the Polity IV index and ranges from –10 to 10. It is lagged one year. *Ethnic and*

¹⁶GDP per capita income is sometimes criticized for failing to account for different intricacies of governments (Thies 2010). However, for the purposes of this study, it serves as an acceptable proxy variable.

religious fractionalization are based on the Soviet Union's ethnic, linguistic, and religious fractionalization (ELF) index.

METHODOLOGY

The empirical model employed in this study builds on Fearon and Laitin's (2003) civil war onset study. They employed a cross-sectional time-series logistic regression, as this is appropriate when using dichotomous dependent variables (Long 1997). However, the time frame used in this article differs from that employed by Fearon and Laitin, as the key independent variable's data availability covers the period 1970–1999. In addition, the present model differs from that of Fearon and Laitin (2003) in that the data in the present study are clustered by country. The effect of clustering by country results in slightly larger, but more accurate, standard errors. These differences are further addressed in the empirical analysis.

Additionally, temporal dependence is a common problem in this type of analysis (Beck, Katz, and Tucker 1998). Several methods, such as fixed effects and cubic splines, can be used to address event history processes observed at discrete intervals (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004). However, there are pitfalls associated with fixed effects, such as suffering a loss of degrees of freedom, and with cubic splines, such as a lack of clear specification and conceptual intuition in “knot” placement. Instead, this study employs cubic polynomials. This approach is much more straightforward and easy to interpret than these other alternatives (Carter and Signorino 2010). The cubic polynomials are listed in the tables that follow in the empirical analysis as t , t^2 , and t^3 . These represent the values of time, time squared, and time cubed, respectively. Finally, since time is measured as a discrete variable in the data, this method of duration analysis is the most appropriate.

EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS

Table 3 contains five empirical models using logistic regression. The first of these, Model 2–1, is an exact replica of Fearon and Laitin (2003) covering their entire time frame. Model 2–2 shows these results adjusted to the 1970–1999 time period. Models 2–1 and 2–2 are similar with the exception of the oil exporting variable no longer holding statistically significant. In addition, the new state variable is dropped by the logistic regression model owing to a lack of any covariance between the variables, as none of the 49 civil war onsets with sufficient data occur in the first year of becoming a new state.¹⁷

¹⁷Croatia, in the midst of civil war when it emerged as a new state in the data set in 1992, was the only occurrence of a new state to experience civil war onset in the time period relevant to this study. However, both Croatia 1992 and Jordan 1970 are dropped due to lack of data.

TABLE 3 Globalization and Civil War Onset, 1970–1999

	Fearon and Laitin (2003)				
	Original (2-1)	Replication 1970–1999 (2-2)	Replication w/clustering (2-3)	Full (2-4)	Components (2-5)
Globalization				−0.078*** (0.023)	
Economic Globalization					−0.031 (0.021)
Social Globalization					−0.065 (0.046)
Political Globalization					−0.003 (0.014)
GDP/Capita	−0.344*** (0.072)	−0.410*** (0.113)	−0.409*** (0.129)	−0.145 (0.095)	−0.091 (0.140)
Previous War	−0.954*** (0.314)	−1.085** (0.450)	−1.075** (0.456)	−1.424*** (0.486)	−1.452*** (0.556)
Population	0.263*** (0.073)	0.218** (0.104)	0.220** (0.088)	0.272*** (0.083)	0.084 (0.155)
Mountains	0.219*** (0.085)	0.270** (0.124)	0.269** (0.129)	0.187* (0.112)	0.253** (0.118)
Noncontiguous	0.443 (0.274)	0.674 (0.469)	0.652 (0.556)	1.016* (0.562)	1.016 (0.728)
Oil	0.858*** (0.279)	0.528 (0.429)	0.535 (0.486)	0.528 (0.468)	0.468 (0.550)
New State	1.709*** (0.339)				
Instability	0.618*** (0.235)	0.750** (0.315)	0.748** (0.299)	0.692** (0.310)	0.537* (0.314)
Democracy	0.021 (0.017)	0.034 (0.024)	0.035 (0.032)	0.049 (0.032)	0.059* (0.032)
Ethnic Fraction	0.166 (0.373)	0.380 (0.550)	0.381 (0.597)	0.767 (0.524)	0.435 (0.577)
Religious Fraction	0.285 (0.509)	0.061 (0.770)	0.078 (0.776)	0.131 (0.780)	0.207 (0.899)
t			−0.019 (0.172)	−0.094 (0.215)	−0.288 (0.230)
t ²			0.001 (0.013)	0.006 (0.016)	0.022 (0.017)
t ³			−0.00002 (0.0003)	−0.00009 (0.0003)	−0.0005 (0.0004)
Constant	−6.731*** (0.736)	−6.104*** (1.113)	−6.028*** (1.309)	−4.628*** (1.396)	−2.123 (1.849)
Observations	6327	3158	3158	3060	2835
Log Likelihood	−480.402	−227.183	−227.168	−214.749	−190.874

Model 2-1 is from Fearon and Laitin (2003). Their New State variable is dropped owing to perfect multicollinearity. Models 2-2 and 2-3 are replications of Fearon and Laitin (2003) with adjustments as described in the text.

Standard errors in parentheses. Two-tailed hypothesis test * $p < .1$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$.




FIGURE 1 Effect of economic globalization on civil war occurrence (dashed lines give 90% confidence interval).

Model 2–3 displays the results of the same model as Model 2–2, except that the data are clustered by country. It is worth noting that the impact of clustering by country is minimal.

As Table 3 demonstrates, globalization is statistically significant in Model 2–4. In Model 2–4 and 2–5, globalization and its components act to reduce the likelihood of the onset of a civil war, though the subcomponents are not statistically significant, with p -values of only .148 and .156 for economic and social globalization, respectively. Figure 1 demonstrates the predicted probabilities across various levels of globalization. These findings are consistent with those of Barbieri and Reuveny (2005), and Elbadawi and Hegre (2008). This also supports the theoretical framework presented by Collier and Hoeffler (2002, 2004) that insurgency increases the opportunity costs of insurgency, as globalization brings with it many additional economic benefits.

One explanation for these findings is that globalization itself is a mitigating factor for civil conflict. Increased global integration increases economic outputs and standards of living, as well as bringing states' populations together through improved social mechanisms. Globalization may enhance the legitimacy of states as standards of living improve and states have more resources at their disposal. It appears that globalization decreases internal violence by raising opportunity costs of joining an insurgency group.

The models in Table 4 show the results of an investigation of H_1 , which states that shocks of globalization—sudden changes in the level of globalization compared to the previous year's level—results in an increase in the propensity of civil war. Model 3–1 in Table 4 suggests that sudden changes in

TABLE 4 Globalization Shocks and Civil War Onset, 1970–1999

	Full (3-1)	Components (3-2)	Globalization × Power (3-3)	Economic Globalization × Power (3-4)
Global shock	0.048* (0.025)		0.056** (0.026)	
Economic shock		0.013** (0.006)		0.011 (0.014)
Social shock		-0.001 (0.034)		
Political shock		0.002 (0.016)		
Globalization shock × Power			-0.006 (0.018)	
Economic globalization × Power				0.001 (0.014)
GDP/capita	-0.393*** (0.129)	-0.380*** (0.132)	-0.376*** (0.134)	-0.396*** (0.150)
Previous War	-1.126** (0.481)	-1.041** (0.511)	-1.127** (0.482)	-1.066** (0.515)
Population	0.245*** (0.089)	0.230** (0.100)	0.247*** (0.090)	0.206** (0.092)
Mountains	0.293** (0.133)	0.372** (0.146)	0.295** (0.133)	0.339** (0.142)
Noncontiguous	0.688 (0.577)	0.630 (0.597)	0.687 (0.578)	0.642 (0.589)
Oil	0.557 (0.484)	0.503 (0.538)	0.567 (0.489)	0.493 (0.551)
Instability	0.779*** (0.300)	0.595* (0.319)	0.776** (0.301)	0.541* (0.317)
Democracy	0.040 (0.032)	0.038 (0.032)	0.041 (0.032)	0.040 (0.032)
Ethnic fraction	0.484 (0.603)	0.266 (0.641)	0.481 (0.604)	0.318 (0.629)
Religious fraction	0.292 (0.777)	-0.219 (0.832)	0.288 (0.775)	-0.235 (0.811)
t	-0.135 (0.225)	-0.402 (0.310)	-0.137 (0.226)	-0.345 (0.302)
t2	0.008 (0.017)	0.029 (0.022)	0.008 (0.017)	0.024 (0.021)
t3	-0.0001 (0.0004)	-0.001 (0.0005)	-0.0001 (0.0004)	-0.001 (0.0004)
Constant	-6.083*** (1.452)	-4.846** (1.882)	-6.120*** (1.449)	-4.634*** (1.746)
Observations	3059	2742	3059	2766
Log likelihood	-219.108	-190.320	-219.077	-195.867

The New State variable used by Fearon and Laitin 2003 is dropped owing to perfect multicollinearity. Standard errors in parentheses. Two-tailed hypothesis test

* $p < .1$ ** $p < .05$ *** $p < .01$.

the level of economic globalization are positive and hold a statistically significant relationship with civil war onset at the .10 level, with a p -value of .051. An increase of one standard deviation in the globalization shock variable results in an increase of 28% in the likelihood of a civil war onset.¹⁸ Model 3–2 demonstrates that, while once again social and political globalization hold no statistical significance, economic globalization shock is significant at the .05 level. This is in contrast to recent work by Elbadawi and Hegre (2008), who measure economic globalization shocks primarily in terms of trade and trade openness. The results suggest that Collier and Hoeffler's theory focusing on the primacy of economic concerns and grievances is supported by this empirical analysis. Economic shocks may lead to displacement of workers, making the costs and benefits associated with joining an insurgent group more attractive and the benefits of good economic times can no longer overshadow the costs of discountenance. The results seen here provide insight into why long standing grievances may be addressed through civil war at a particular time rather than at another.

Furthermore, the theory presented by Rosenau (1990, 2003) is also supported. Some workers are displaced during economic shocks, even during periods of economic growth; these workers may find that their skill set is no longer needed in the growing economy as foreign competition may replace them. Sudden economic shocks, positive or negative, resulting from economic integration and the accompanying adjustment of the domestic economy overwhelm state capabilities to deal with increasing discontent as individuals are unable to cope with the sudden turbulence. Even if states are enjoying enhanced capabilities, the unrest from a sudden shock can outpace the state's coping mechanisms, resulting in civil war. These findings differ from the conclusions drawn by Barbieri and Reuveny (2005), suggesting that shocks provide a different dynamic than globalization more generally.

An example of an insurgency stemming directly from the effects of globalization shocks is that of the 1994 Zapatista Rebellion in Chiapas, Mexico. The leader of the insurgent *Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional* (EZLN), Subcommandante Marcos, explicitly cites trade pacts and the loss of indigenous culture as the primary causal factors for organizing the uprising of the largely rural, Mayan population against the Mexican state and their perceived corporate collaborators (Marcos 1995). Owing to this viewpoint, it was symbolic that the armed conflict began on January 1, 1994, to coincide with the implementation of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). NAFTA was perceived by these insurgents as an attempt to enhance Mexico's global openness at the detriment of its traditional societies.

¹⁸This estimate was calculated using Clarify Software (King et al. 2000; Tomz, Wittenberg, and King 2003). Prior war, noncontiguous state, oil producer and stability are set to their modal values, while GDP/capita, population, mountains, democracy, and ethnic and religious fractionalization are set to the means.

Subcommandante Marcos goes so far as to argue that globalization is the manifestation of a “total war,” or “world war,” of financial markets into the social and political spheres and calls for a global response (Marcos 2001). Interestingly, it is the use of global media outlets and of technological outlets such as the internet and satellite television that aided the EZLN in their efforts to fund their movement and spread their ideological goals. In this way, the EZLN are an interesting case of what Rosenau referred to as “framgegration.”

Figure 2 displays the predicted probabilities of increases in the level of absolute economic globalization shock. As can be seen, as the level of shock increases, the risk of civil war onset does as well. Keep in mind that the level of shock displayed here is in absolute terms, meaning that it creates an inverted “U” shape. That is, when either economic globalization is reduced or increased, there is a change in the risk of an insurgency beginning. Note how the risk is relatively flat at low levels, but an increase in the level of globalization of about 40% doubles the risk of civil war onset in that year. While such dramatic shifts are rare, so is civil war. Having great fluctuation for a number of years, as the Central African Republic, Senegal, and Sierra Leone experienced, would result in repeated episodes of heightened risk.

Notably, in both the composite globalization and component globalization shock models in Table 4, Models 3–1 and 3–2, per capita income was negative and statistically significant. In the Chiapas case, the aggregate Mexican economy and GDP/capita—the measure of state power—also grew. However, they did not grow at pace with the level of globalization. Again, even in the cases of aggregate growth, globalization produces winners and losers. If the state cannot provide coping mechanisms to offset discontent among the losers, it may still face civil conflict even if overall




FIGURE 2 Effect of economic globalization shocks on civil war occurrence (dashed lines give 90% confidence interval).

the state is benefiting. Despite many profiting from globalization, sudden increases in global integration are still destabilizing for states as some groups miss out on economic benefits and are losers in the suddenly more competitive market.

Collier and Hoeffler (2002, 2004) and Fearon and Laitin (2003) theorize that these internal characteristics of state power provide the main causal effect on the onset of civil war. This suggests that the impact of shocks of globalization is contingent on these characteristics. The last two models in Table 3 display the results of testing H_2 , exploring the relationship between globalization shock and state power. In these models, the composite globalization index and economic globalization are used in the interaction terms as economic globalization was the only subcomponent that was statistically significant.

Since Table 4 is displaying interactive terms, it is important not to simply look at the results and interpret them as we would additive regression models, since the interactive terms are multiplicative (Kam and Franzese 2007; see also Braumoeller 2004). The interactive and constitutive terms have no inherent meaning on their own. Instead, the marginal effects should be calculated to provide substantively meaningful results (Brambor, Clark, and Golder 2006).

Model 2–3 and 2–4 find no relationship between the interaction terms of either globalization shock and state power (GDP/capita) nor economic globalization shock and state power. In two graphs that are not displayed, the 95 percent confidence interval of the marginal effects of either globalization or its economic component did not differ significantly from zero at any value of state power.¹⁹ As such, there appears to be little support for H_2 , suggesting that weak states are no more impacted by globalization shocks than stronger states. Instead, dramatic changes in globalization levels appears to impact strong and weak states the same. That is, large globalization shocks can outpace coping mechanisms even in strong countries that can afford to implement them. This finding suggests that it is the speed at which the shock occurs that is key as opposed to just that there is a change at all. The suddenness of the shock prevents the state from enacting coping mechanisms. These results are consistent with Hays (2009) finding that the reactions to the negative aspects of globalization generate discontent even in the wealthy OECD countries.

CONCLUSION

Consistent with post-international theory, a systemic explanation for civil war owing to sudden changes, or shocks, in the level of globalization is

¹⁹Marginal effects were found using the Grinter program in Stata 10 (Boehmke 2008).

suggested by the findings. Turbulence, particularly of the economic variety, seems to have a statistically significant relationship with the onset of civil war. Sudden shocks of globalization can overwhelm a state's capacity to provide mechanisms for its citizens to cope with the dramatic changes. Sudden shocks of globalization may be an intervening variable that provides the catalyst for when insurgencies occur and why these grievances are being addressed at a specific moment. Only after these shocks is the social order suddenly favorable for many displaced or dejected people to see the costs of joining an insurgency as in their own interests.

These results are consistent with the economic causes and grievances posited by Collier and Hoeffler (2002, 2004). Consistent with their greed hypothesis, sudden positive shocks can lead to insurgents seeking to gain control of these resources. Moreover, these results may bridge the gap between their theory and that presented by Fearon and Laitin (2003). While positive shocks lead to groups seeking to gain control over new resources, negative shocks suddenly reduce state strength, leaving them vulnerable to insurgents. Following negative shocks and the subsequent increase in insurgent membership owing to the change in economic calculations, states are unable to collect the necessary resources to effectively immediately put down uprisings.

There are important real world implications that can be garnered from these results. States may not be able to refrain from all types of globalization; in fact, the results in Table 3 suggest that doing so is detrimental to their well-being. However, states can limit, to some degree, how quickly they open themselves up to the global community. Shock therapy treatments, as suggested by the Washington Consensus and required by many financial assistance donor programs of aid in the 1990s, are dangerous and destabilizing approaches that increase the risk of political violence in recipient states. Additionally, state leaders should look beyond aggregate totals and consider those that are not well equipped to compete in a more competitive global market or that may find their values challenged by new ideas and target coping mechanisms at said groups. Constructing some form of coping mechanism for the losers of globalization is important to prevent violent backlashes.

Another interesting finding in this study is the role of democracy; namely, that it does not appear to hold a statistically significant impact on determining civil war onset. In all but one model it was statistically insignificant and in the one model where it did reach statistical significance, it was associated with an increase in civil war. One reason for this may be that populations respond to globalization differently depending on the type of democracy or authoritative regime they live in. For example, Hays (2009) finds that majoritarian democracies in OECD states respond to anti-globalization efforts differently than corporatist states. While his study does not focus on civil war, the idea that democratic and authoritarian regimes may not behave uniformly in response to domestic conflict merits investigation.

Additional research may also attempt to uncover the role that social and political globalization play in the onset of civil war. While the results here suggest that they do not hold a vital role, this is inconsistent with the theoretical premise presented by most post-internationalists. While the variable for economic globalization shocks is consistently statistically significant, the composite score of globalization, of which it comprises only one-third, is also significant. This indicates that the interaction of economic, social, and political aspects of globalization may yet have some role in explaining the onset of civil war.

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