

Online Appendix

Troop Placement Activity


Table 2: Total Troop Placements Abroad
in Country-Years, 1981-2007.

US	589
USSR/Russia	358
France	223
UK	202
Italy	76
East Germany	68
Netherlands	66
Singapore	62
Australia	62
Cuba	61

Table 2 reports the 10 countries with the most total number of troop placements abroad, measured in country-years, from 1981–2007. As shown in the table, major powers do tend to be more active than other states. In addition to the US, USSR, France, and the UK being the most active in terms of troop deployments, they are also more likely to place troops across the globe. Conversely, the other states listed in the table primarily place non-invasion troops in states within the same geographical region. Notably, China did not deploy any non-invasion troops during this period.

Figure 7 displays the total number of troops deployed abroad by the US, UK, France, and Russia. As can be seen, the US maintained roughly the same number of troops abroad throughout the period under review, with a brief decline from the early 1990s to early 2000s. A similar dynamic is seen by the UK. France experiences a gradual decline, with observable steps at the start of each decade. Russia experiences sharp declines in the mid- and late-eighties, a brief spike at after the breakup of the Soviet Union—these are likely troops present in the newly independent successor states—followed by a decline through the mid-nineties, before an increase in the late-nineties.

Figure 7: Total Non-Invasion Troops Deployed by Major Powers



Notes: The y-axis is the log base 10 of troop deployments.

Aside from the occasional increases in troop numbers identified above, it is clear that most instances of troop increases—i.e. *New Troops*—result from troops being redeployed by the major powers. That is, our dependent variable reflects changing priorities, and efforts to counter-balance these shifts, by major powers.

Control Variables

We control for a number of other factors that may influence the decision to deploy troops abroad. We begin with the major power's economic considerations. A major power's decision to begin or increase troop deployments may be conditioned by its current economic climate. When the economy is strong, the pursuit of foreign policy change is more attractive than when the domestic economy is stagnant (Martinez Machain and Morgan 2013). Thus, in times of economic prosperity major powers will be more willing to expand their spheres of influence through troop deployments and even challenge their rivals' spheres of influence by deploying troops to areas in which a rival has an existing military presence. In times of economic hardship, while we do not expect major powers to completely give up on their global military presence, we do expect to see a relative reduction in it. We operationalize the degree of prosperity or hardship as *Major Power Economic Growth* and measure it as

the growth in energy consumption from the previous to the current year. We obtain energy consumption data from the Correlates of War (Singer, Bremer, and Stuckey 1972).¹⁸

We also control for a variety of strategic factors at the edge- and minor power-level: the minor power's military capabilities, whether a minor power is engaged in an international war, the amount of trade between a major and minor power, and whether major and minor powers share an alliance. Data on *Minor Power Capabilities* are obtained from Singer, Bremer, and Stuckey (1972). Minor powers' engagement in an international war may affect troop deployments by major powers to contain a conflict. We measure *Minor Power in International War* using data from Bell and Johnson (2015). We expect that major powers that have a defensive pact with a minor power are more likely to send troops to their ally. We measure the variable *Alliance* using data obtained from Gibler (2009). We also expect that major powers with large trade volumes with a minor power are more likely to deploy troops with the minor power. We measure *Trade* between a major and minor power using data from the Correlates of War project (Barbieri, Keshk, and Pollins 2009) and log it to control for skewness. We also include a control for whether a minor power is a major power's *Former Colony* using data from Hensel (2014). The expectation is that, major powers are more likely to deploy troops to their former, due to their historical ties.

Finally, we account for strategic actions on the part of major powers to one another's future expected growth. Existing research suggests that states in general, including major powers, do not conduct foreign policy solely on what is observable in the present, but also what they expect in the future. Research on preventive war, for example, illustrates that leaders' expectations of an adversary's future growth in power influences the decision to take preventative action (Bell and Johnson 2015). To model this we employ a measure of expected military power developed by Bell and Johnson (2015, 126-127).

Bell and Johnson estimate a model to generate predicted *future* values of power for each state. The dependent variable in the Bell and Johnson study relies on two observable components—military spending and military personnel—from the composite index of na-

¹⁸We use energy consumption rather than GDP growth based on data availability for Russia/USSR prior to 1991.

tional capabilities (Singer, Bremer, and Stuckey 1972). The dependent variable is regressed on a set of covariates that are expected to predict military power that are readily observable to other states: economic capacity, the presence of international threats, and domestic political factors. The resulting coefficients and the values for the current year's covariates are then used to generate fitted values for the next year. For additional details on how the variable is constructed, see Bell and Johnson (2015, 126-127). We subtract this predicted value by the current year to calculate Δ *Rival Major Power Capabilities*. We expect that major powers will try to balance against the growing power of the rival.¹⁹

¹⁹We follow the same coding rules to identify rivals as in fn 16.

Robustness

Since the US is the most active of major powers at deploying troops abroad, we re-estimated our main model with an additional control for the US. These results are shown in Table 3. As expected, the coefficient on *US indicator* is positive and statistically significant. The rest of the results do not change in direction or statistical significance.

Table 3: A Model of Troop Placements, Controlling for the US

	<i>Full Sample</i> <i>1981–2007</i>
Years	
<i>Spatial Lags:</i>	
Ideological Similarity (by Region)	-0.215 (0.075)
Spatial Lag (t-1)	1.647 (0.264)
Major Power Economic Growth	-0.017 (0.013)
Δ Rival Major Power Capabilities	0.067 (0.029)
Minor Power Capabilities	0.433 (0.072)
Minor Power in International War	0.767 (0.343)
Alliance	1.444 (0.122)
Trade	0.063 (0.029)
Former Colony	1.707 (0.164)
US indicator	1.454 (0.123)
Constant	-5.765 (0.184)
Observations	22480
Minor Powers	190
(Pseudo) Log-likelihood	-1621.042

Notes: Standard errors are estimated from 300 bootstraps via a Gibbs sampler after 20 burnin simulations and thinning every 10 iterations.